HISTORY OF THE FIFTH LIGHT HORSE REGIMENT 1914 TO 1919 PART 1. FROM SEPTEMBER, 1914, TO OCTOBER, 1917

After the departure of the First Light Horse Brigade, A.I.F., in September, 1914, it was decided to send another Light Horse Brigade overseas. The First Contingent included the First, Second, Third and Fourth Light Horse Regiments. The Second Brigade was to consist of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Regiments. The Seventh Regiment was to be a composite one - Headquarters, Machine Gun Section, and one Squadron from Queensland, the second from South Australia and the third from Western Australia.

When the Second Light Horse Regiment had left for overseas a camp was formed at the Exhibition Buildings, Brisbane. Lieutenant-Colonel Miell, of South Australia, was appointed to command the composite Regiment. He arrived in Brisbane and took over. After a few days at the Exhibition, the camp was shifted to Enoggera. Shortly afterwards it was decided by the authorities to despatch a third Brigade, and arrangements with regard to the Second Brigade were altered. The Second Light Horse Brigade. under the command of Brigadier-General Ryrie, was still to consist of the 5th, 6th and 7th Regiments, but the 5th Regiment was to be wholly formed in Queensland and the 6th and 7th Regiments in New South Wales. The 8th, 9th and 10th Regiments, forming the 3rd Light Horse Brigade, were formed in Victoria, South Australia and Western Australia respectively. Lieutenant-Colonel Miell accordingly gave over command of the original 7th and went to South Australia, where he took over command of the

9th Regiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Hubert Harris was appointed to command the 5th Light Horse Regiment, Major L. C. Wilson being second in command. Lieutenant-Colonel Harris took over on the 28th October, 1914.

Active recruiting was carried on and more than the necessary number of men volunteered. A selection was made after the men were tested in riding and shooting, equipment and horses were issued, musketry and training were carried on. While in camp at Enoggera the Regiment was presented with its first flag by the Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson, the flag having been made by four ladies interested in the Regiment, Mrs. L. C. Wilson, Mrs. Espie Dods, Miss Jean Darvall and Miss Forrest, the design being a brown kangaroo on maroon bunting.

On the 12th December, 1914, the Regiment, including the Machine Gun Section, entrained to the strength of 550 at Newmarket, for Liverpool, New South Wales, where it was intended that the 2nd Light Horse Brigade should concentrate and undergo further training. The fact that the Regiment was about to leave was not made, public. The Regiment accordingly left Brisbane without any public demonstration or send-off.

The Regiment duly arrived at Liverpool on the 14th December, all horses having been dipped at Wallangarra en route. The other two Regiments of the Brigade, the 6th and 7th, were encamped at Holdsworthy, near Liverpool. On the 19th December the Regiment left Liverpool for Sydney by road, stopping at Flemington on the night of the 19th-20th.

On the morning of the 20th the Regiment embarked on the S.S. "Persic," Transport No. A 34. In the afternoon of that day, the transport moved into the harbour, and on the morning of the 21st December, 1914, left Port Jackson.

The names of the first Officers of the Regiment were as follows:

The transport arrived at Albany on the 28th December. At this port the fleet, consisting of some sixteen steamers, assembled. The convoy left Albany on the 31st December. arrived at Aden on the 20th January, 1915, left that port on the 21st, and, passing through the Suez Canal, arrived at Alexandria on the 1st February.

The voyage lasted 42 days. One man died during the voyage and was buried at sea. Seven horses died from sickness. During the voyage intensive training was carried out. A certain part of the regiment was detailed to look after the horses. and the remainder underwent systematic instruction. Special attention was given to the training of non-commissioned officers. During the voyage the various examinations for N.C.O.'s were held, and shortly before the termination of the voyage those men who had shown greatest merit were appointed to non-commissioned rank. Regular courses of lectures were given to and by the officers. Musketry, including practices at landscape targets was given special attention to.

The same day that the regiment arrived at Alexandria viz., the 1st February. the Regiment entrained for Cairo, where it arrived the same evening. The horses were then led from Cairo Railway Station to Maadi, a distance of 10 miles. It was not considered advisable that the horses should be ridden at once after six. weeks on board ship.

At this time the Australian and New Zealand troops in Egypt were organised under General Birdwood as the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (Anzac), the Second Light Horse Brigade (Ryrie) being Corps Troops.

As soon as the camp settled down, systematic training for mounted operations was commenced. Training from troop formation to brigade formation was carried out. Tactical schemes in the desert and round the foot-hills of Mokattams were practised. Special attention was given to rifle shooting. Route marches to Helouan were made. Swimming the horses across a branch of the Nile at the Barrage was engaged in to gain experience in crossing rivers.

CHAPTER 3.

GALLIPOLI (MAY AND JUNE, 1915).

In April, 1915, all the available infantry in Egypt were sent to Gallipoli, where the first troops landed on the 25th April, 1915. Affairs were not, however, going as smoothly in Gallipoli as had been anticipated. Heavy casualties were reported, and large numbers of wounded men were returned to Egypt. It was soon apparent that the forces which had already landed were not sufficient to force the Dardanelles, and the matter of reinforcements came up for serious consideration. The question was mooted as to whether the Light Horse should go dismounted to Gallipoli.

Accordingly a meeting was held of the Commanding Officers of the Brigade, to ascertain the feeling of the units as to whether they should volunteer to go dismounted. At this meeting there were present Lieutenant-Colonels Cox, Arnott and Harris, together with the Brigadier-General, Ryrie. Lieut.-Colonel Harris was a strong advocate for that course, and the Brigadier decided to offer the services of the Brigade dismounted. The offer was accepted, and on the 9th May, 1915, the Machine Gun Section, under Lieutenant Kennedy, marched out for Gallipoli.

On the 15th May the Regiment marched out from Maadi, dismounted, with 23 officers and 431 other ranks, leaving three officers and 224 other ranks with the horses. Major Righetti was left in charge of all the Brigade details and horses. Father Bergin, of the Jesuit Fathers, accompanied us as Padre. He remained with us until October, when he was evacuated. In November his place was taken by Captain Mullins, who stopped with the Regiment until its disbandment in 1919,

The dismounted party left by train from Maadi at 7.40 p.m. for Bab el Louk, from where they marched to Cairo Railway Station, left the latter railway station at 11.10 p.m.. arrived at Alexandria at daybreak on the 16th and embarked on the Transport A 25, late "Lutzow," together with the rest of the Brigade and part of the 3rd Light Horse Brigade.

The Brigade arrived at Cape Helles on the evening of the 18th May, 1915, where brisk fighting was going on. We here had our first experience of seeing aeroplanes being shelled by the enemy.

On the morning of the 19th May we left Cape Helles and arrived at Anzac Cove at about 6.30 p.m. There was extremely heavy rifle and gun fire going on all that night. It turned out afterwards that a determined attack was being made by the Turks on the Australian lines. We on the ships, however, did not know that, and thought it was the usual performance that was being enacted, and, from the noise made by the guns, shells and rifles, the prospect did not look particularly healthy.

On the morning of the 20th May, 1915, the Regiment embarked on the trawler "Claxton." As the troops approached the shore on the trawler and later on in the boats, they were subjected to shell fire by the Turkish batteries. Fortunately, there were no casualties, although the shells were so close that they splashed water on the men. This silly practice of landing men in daylight within medium range of the Turkish batteries continued for some time, until one day a lighter had some fifty casualties, when it dawned on the person responsible for disembarkation of troops that they could be landed just as easily at night and without any such risk.

Immediately after the landing, the Regiment moved up Monash Gully to near the old Turkish Headquarters. At nightfall the Regiment received orders to report to Brigadier-General Chauvel, O.C., No. 3 Section of Defence. On moving out the Regiment was shelled, suffering four casualties.

Our march, or rather movement, along the road to General Chauvel's Headquarters was more exciting than dignified. These were the days before the sap that subsequently existed along the edge of this gully was built. The Turks had a post at the head of the gully, and had the road in full view and at short range. At short distances along each side of the road were built sand-bag traverses, and the safest way to negotiate the road was to run from one traverse to the next forward one on the opposite side, and so on along the road, thus regaining cover before the Turkish snipers could fire an aimed shot. One of our squadron leaders brought down on his head a

shower of abuse from the local residents through his striking a match on this open road after dusk in order to light a cigarette.

On reporting to Brigadier-General Chauvel we were placed in reserve in the First Light Horse Brigade Lines for the night, and spent a very wakeful one, as another Turkish attack was expected, and our artillery was particularly energetic and the echoes were very marked. Owing to some peculiarity in the atmosphere, the course of the shells could be followed across the sky, as if the shells were red hot. This was the only occasion on which the writer noticed this effect.

The following day, the 21st May, 1915, the Regiment moved into bivouac in this valley. The day was taken up in digging in and digging communication trenches. In these lines were saw for the first time the "Japanese mortar," a very effective weapon, but unfortunately it only had a few rounds of ammunition. Its next appearance to us was at Ryrie's Post, about ten days before the Evacuation. It was again suffering from the said malady, shortness of ammunition, as by the time they had fired their ranging shots all the ammunition was expended. On the 23rd May, 1915, the Brigade was attached to the 1st Australian Infantry Division. On the 24th May an armistice was agreed upon between the Australian and Turkish Forces from 7.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m., to bury the enormous number of Turkish dead which were lying between the two sets of trenches.

On the 25th May the Regiment viewed the submarining of the British battleship. H.M.S. "Triumph." Most of. us saw the torpedo explode and the ship turn over and sink.

On the 26th May, Lieutenant Banff and the 4th Reinforcements arrived.

On the 30th May, Captain D. C. Cameron was wounded by rifle and four other ranks by shell fire.

On the morning of the 31st May the Regiment was attached to No. 1 Section, one Squadron going to each of the 9th, 10th and 11th Battalions. "C" Squadron, temporarily under the command of Major L. C. Wilson, was attached to the 9th Battalion and occupied the extreme right flank at Sapper's Post.

On the evening of the 6th June, 1915, Major Wilson received instructions to detail a party consisting of one officer and twelve other ranks to proceed at 11 p.m. to the "Twin Trenches," some 1,500 yards beyond our front line trenches toward Gaba Tepe, and ascertain if those trenches were occupied as strongly as usual and to rouse the enemy if they got an opportunity. Lieutenant Hanly, who had previously volunteered for this class of work. and twelve other ranks were accordingly detailed for this purpose, and proceeded to the Twin Trenches.

Lieutenant Hanly and party reconnoitered the Twin Trenches. In doing this the patrol mounted the enemy parapet and fired into their trench from that position. While doing this Lieutenant Hanly was shot. Two other men were wounded., Lieutenant Hanly was carried back a few hundred yards, when the sergeant in charge decided that life was extinct. As the patrol was still under heavy rifle fire, the body was left, and the rest of the party returned to our lines. A party was then sent out under Lieutenant Lyons to try and recover Lieutenant Hanly's body, but after a search, during which they were fired on by the Turks, had to return unsuccessful. Another party, under Lieutenant Chatham, also made an attempt the following night to find the body, but they also were unsuccessful. The officers of the Regiment arranged for a tablet to be erected in the Church at Dalby, Queensland, to the memory of this gallant officer.

On June 19th the Regiment took over the right portion of the 9th Infantry trenches in No. 1 Section. A covering party - Lieutenant Chatham and 34 other ranks - proceeded along 'A' Ridge, while Major F. J. White and 200 other ranks of the 6th Light Horse Regiment constructed a communication trench 200 yards along from No. 1 Post to the Knoll 200 yards south-west of machine gun position on "A" Ridge, subsequently officially known as "Harris Ridge," in honour of our Regimental Commander. Lieutenant Chatham met a Turkish Patrol at 11.30 p.m., about 20 strong, near Balkan Gun Pits, and reported three Turks killed by rifle fire.

On 22nd June, 1915, the new post, which was subsequently called "Chatham Post," after Lieutenant Chatham of the Regiment, was placed under command of the Regiment.

On the 28th June, information was received by Army Corps Headquarters at Anzac Cove from the Commander-in-Chief that an attack would be made by our troops at Cape Helles on a portion of the Achi Baba position, and he asked our Corps to help in any way they could, so as to ensure that the Turks facing our troops at Helles would not be reinforced by men opposite Anzac Cove. Accordingly, orders were issued for a demonstration at Anzac Cove, to prevent any reinforcements as above. The 5th Light Horse Regiment, two troops of the 7th Light Horse Regiment and two companies of the 9th Battalion, supported by the 11th Battalion of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, advanced on the right and attacked the Turkish trenches towards Gaba Tepe and towards the lower ridges of the Lone Pine position. The consequences of this advance were that the Turkish reinforcements at Eski Koui, between Anzac and Achi Baba, who in all probability would have gone to oppose our forces further south at Helles, were turned back and advanced to meet our attack. The 5th Regiment moved along Harris Ridge as far as the Balkan Gun Pits, where they were subjected to heavy machine gun and rifle fire from the Echelon trenches, and also from Gaba Tepe. They were also subjected to shell fire from one of our destroyers, the commander of which had not been informed that our men were operating outside our own lines. When the desired effect of holding the Turkish Reserves had been carried out, orders were given for withdrawal to our trenches. This operation was successfully carried out. The Regiment's casualties during the afternoon were heavy, amounting to 23 killed and 79 wounded.

The following is an extract from Army Corps Order of 29th June:

"Our Light Horse and Infantry succeeded most excellently in doing what was intended, and were ably supported by all batteries of the Australian, New Zealand and Indian Artillery, and by the newly arrived Howitzer Battery of the Lowland Division. Between them the guns fired 1,400 rounds into the advancing Turks and into their reserves. On several occasions they caught

small bodies of Turks advancing in the open, killing and wounding many of them. The Turks were also seen to mass in large numbers in the deep valley behind Lonesome Pine and Johnston's Jolly. Our Howitzer Batteries got well into them there, and though it is impossible to say what the casualties were, we may take it that we probably inflicted very heavy losses upon them.

"158 Complimentary.- The Army Corps Commander has much pleasure in publishing the names in the attached supplement of officers, N.C.O.'s and men which have been brought to his notice for good services performed during the operations on our Right Flank on June 28th, 1915. He wishes to thank them for the good services they rendered and to congratulate all ranks on the successful carrying out of the task allotted to them by the G.O.C. - in-Chief, which prevented the enemy reinforcing the Krithia position from troops opposite our front:

5th Light Horse Regiment:

Major Midgley, S., D.S.O. - Led his Squadron throughout the action under heavy shell and rifle fire

582, Sergt. Waite, F. M. Attended to and carried out a number of wounded from within fifty yards of the enemy's trenches under heavy fire.

138, Pte. Silverlock, A. E. (M.O.'s Orderly). Behaved gallantly throughout the day, tending wounded and bearing them back from the firing line.

690, Pte. Urquhart, W. T. D. Carried messages in firing line under heavy shell and rifle fire, also attended wounded men."

JULY, 1915, SERVICE ROUTINE.

On the 29th June, 1915, the Regiment took over the line from the Beach to Machine Gun Corner on Harris Ridge, including Chatham's Post. This line, which formed the original front line on the right flank of Anzac, formed the base of the Regiment's position up to the end of November, when we shifted into Ryrie's Post. As previously stated, we moved along the Ridge to Chatham's Post on the 19th June. There was never any question of being satisfied with one's present position, it was a fixed principle to be always sapping or tunnelling to the front, with a view of occupying fresh ground, to give us more freedom in rear of our firing line and to wear down the enemy's morale. No one was allowed to be idle; all were worked to the limit of their endurance, and, when the numbers became reduced, some beyond it. Our only means of communication with Chatham's Post for some little time after its first occupation, was by means of the sap running some 30 yards parallel to the Beach to Wright's Gully and from that gully up to the Post. Accordingly, an alternate means was soon provided along the Ridge from the Machine Gun Post, the first part by tunnel and the second part by a deep sap. Later on a tunnel was made from near Regimental Headquarters to open into Wright's Gully. Rifle pits (the Gully Pits) were then made near the mouth of Wright's Gully on the edge of Blamey's Meadow, and a further batch called the "Centre Pits" half-way up the slope. These last mentioned pits were not sited by us, and were subsequently abandoned, as they had no field of fire. A continuous line of trench was then dug from Chatham's down to the edge of Blamey's Meadow, and thus became our front firing line towards Gaba Tepe. Another Beach Post, just forward of Wright's Gully, was erected, and a listening post formed further along the beach, where the wire between the forward trench and the Beach ended. As the firing line was now forward, it became necessary for the Garrison to move forward too, so as to be close to their fighting posts. A network of saps and communication trenches was brought into existence between Wright's Gully and the front line, and the men's dug-outs were built off them, "A" Squadron's around

Chatham's, "B" Squadron's near the mouth of Wright's Gully and "C" Squadron's in rear of Chatham's.

Chatham's Post was improved and strengthened by forming a second tier of firing and bombing trench on the top of the Post, with access thereto only from the rear. A good supply of bombs was always kept on the top tier, so that if the front and lower trenches had been rushed, the occupants would have found themselves in an unpleasant position. On the occupation of Wilson's Lookout very onerous works were taken in hand, but full particulars of these are described later in this narrative.

Normal life on the Peninsula embraced night post duty, night patrols, day observation, sniping, digging, wiring, ration and water carrying. Night patrolling is dealt with later, sniping in Chapter 10. Digging has been referred to above. If digging could be done with safety by day it was then done, but most of it had to be done by night, as the work was usually under enemy observation. Night post duty consisted of watching tactical points on the trench system, to stop a rush, give the alarm and observe and listen for enemy movement. The country right up to our trenches was covered by scrub, and but for our patrols an energetic and quickly moving enemy could mass within a few yards of our trenches. The enemy certainly had the capacity for moving quietly on the stony ridges in front of our position. A post usually consisted of an N.C.O. and three men, with an officer, assisted by a sergeant, in charge of a group of posts. The three men took it in turns to do sentry duty, two hours on and four off, while the N.C.O. was supposed to post every sentry and generally supervise his post. In some instances, double posts were constituted - two N.C.O.'s and six men - which made it easier and more comfortable for all, but unfortunately it was seldom that so many could be spared. In theory, a man should get at least two nights' sleep to one on night duty, but, owing to the shortage of men, it was often a night off to one on, and in the days of Wilson's Lookout it often worked out at two or three nights on duty to one resting. Night posts were posted just after dusk, so that the extra movement could not be observed by the enemy, and they remained on duty until "stand down" was given after daylight. The whole Regiment was roused every morning an hour before dawn and

"stood to," fully equipped, in their fighting positions until "stand down." All ranks were ordered to sleep in their boots and clothes during the whole time we were on Gallipoli, and the order was rigorously enforced. Men could take their boots off in the daytime when things were seen to be quiet and so ease their feet. It must be remembered that from the end of May, when we first went into the trenches, until the morning of the 20th December, the last day of Evacuation, the Regiment was never for a day out of the front firing line, and that line was, in parts, only a matter of seconds from the enemy trenches. At Wilson's Lookout, at one time, the distance was 22 yards. In the event of an enemy raid, there would have been no time to put on boots or clothes.

In daylight there was no necessity to keep sentry posts on duty, so some two posts only for observations were detailed. Special members were selected for this purpose, and kept on the duty continuously, so as to become thoroughly acquainted with the country in front. They were supplied with telescopes and glasses, and it was their particular duty to watch for enemy movement, even though beyond artillery range, and all visible alteration in the enemy works. This information was sent daily to Brigade and on to higher formations, with the result that valuable deductions as to the enemy's movements and intentions were made by those whose duty it was to digest all these reports. Wiring was, of course, done at night. It was a particularly unpleasant occupation, owing to the proximity of the enemy trenches and the numerous rockets and flares sent up by them. When the work was impossible in the open, wooden frames with a mass of barbed wire wound round them, were made in the trenches and pushed up in front of the trench with poles. Later, when things were quiet, a man would crawl out and lash these frames into one long line. The transport of rations and water entailed a large amount of work. We were about a mile from the landing stages. The rations were usually brought from the Beach to Brigade Headquarters by mule pack, and carried by man pack from Brigade to the Regiment, a distance of about a quarter of a mile. Sometimes we had to bring the rations from the Beach. Water was always a serious question. There were no running streams in our jurisdiction. Wells had been dug in the gullies near the Landing Beaches, but the supply

was small, and our water fatigues often had to wait hours before their turn came to fill their petrol tins. Two tins of two gallons each formed a load. A gallon a day per man was the normal issue (drinking, cooking and washing), but it was not always available. Later during our sojourn, water was brought by ship to the Peninsula. We made efforts to get water in our own area. Wells were sunk on the beach above high water mark and water only slightly brackish was got. The wells, however, only lasted a couple of days each, as the water in them very soon became too salt to drink, and the labour expended was not justified by the results. In our ranks we had alleged water diviners. One picked a site at the head of Wright's Gully. The enthusiasts dug down sixty feet, but without finding any water. Later on we lent one of our men to the British at Suvla Bay for water divining duty, and we understood that he was very successful in that locality. About this time the use of hydraulic sluicing as an offensive weapon was raised by Sergeant D. Fraser, of C Squadron, 5th Regiment. Several of the Turkish trenches were within a few yards of our front line. Fraser pointed out that if a powerful hydraulic sluicing plant was available, the parapet and head cover on these trenches could be washed away in the course of a few seconds. Salt water could be pumped up from the sea and brought by pipes to our frontline trenches and then thrown on to the enemy lines in the same way that mining by hydraulic sluicing is carried out in some parts of Australia and in British Columbia. It was pointed out that later on saps could be worked towards the other Turkish trenches to within sluicing range, when the nozzles of the hoses could be directed under cover. Sergeant Fraser first mentioned this to Major Wilson, to whom the scheme seemed an excellent one. Major Wilson passed the scheme on, and it went through the regular channels to the Corps Commander. The Corps made further investigations in the matter and arranged to send an officer to England to see about the necessary plant. Final arrangements, however, had not been made by the time of the Evacuation, so the scheme was not actually put into force.

During the month of July, active patrolling took place

along Harris Ridge and along the beach towards Gaba Tepe and into Poppy Valley. These patrols were usually composed of an officer and about twenty other ranks. They would get out into the scrub on the ridge and wait for the Turkish patrols. It was impossible for our men to move about these stony, scrubby ridges without making a lot of noise, and the only satisfactory way was to get out early and wait for the enemy patrols.

On several occasions their patrols came into contact with ours. The Turkish patrols usually got the worst of it. Lieutenants Chatham and Bolingbroke and Sergeant Waite did very fine work on these patrols. On some occasions our people met enemy patrols of overwhelming numbers, and consequently had to retire. A certain number of casualties were suffered by our patrols on occasions such as these. This happened on the night of the 21st July when Lieutenant Bolingbroke and thirty men went out from Beach Post to patrol Harris Ridge. They found Harris Ridge, to within 100 yards of Chatham Post, strongly held by the enemy who opened heavy rifle and machine gun fire on our patrol. Owing to the darkness, their shooting was unaimed and our patrol got back with the loss of only one killed. Shortly after this, the same night, about 200 of the enemy attacked the Beach Post but were driven back.

On the night of the 31st July, 1915, the 3rd Infantry Brigade made an attack on the Turkish trenches in front of Tasmania Post. The operations were to start shortly before moon rise. The 2nd Light Horse Brigade (Ryrie) were to man their trenches and open fire by way of demonstration to attract the attention of the enemy. Our C.O., Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, took up a position in the machine gun observation post. At 8 p.m. the 3rd Infantry Brigade attacked. This provoked heavy shell fire from the Turks. One shell exploded about our machine gun observation post. A bullet entered the loop-hole and struck Lieutenant-Colonel Harris on the neck. He died within two minutes. One man was wounded on the same evening on the beach post and another

as he returned from ration fatigue. On the 1st August Colonel Harris was buried on Shell Green at 9.15 p.m., the ceremony being conducted by the Dean of Sydney and the Reverend Robertson. The officers of the Regiment arranged for the erection of a tablet in the Brisbane Grammar School to the memory of our late commanding officer. To Colonel Harris is due the credit of setting that standard of discipline and efficiency which marked the Regiment throughout its whole career.

The following is an extract from Brigade Routine Order, No. 163:

The following message was received from G.O.C., Anzac:

"To General Ryrie, Commanding 2nd L.H. Brigade.

Major L. C. Wilson now took over command of the Regiment, and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel.

On 6th August our Third Reinforcements, under Lieutenant Newton, and details under Lieutenant Ryan, reported at Anzac for duty.

Arrangements were now taken in hand for the big offensive which the High Command decided to take with the object of breaking through to the Dardanelles and finishing the campaign on Gallipoli.

The Corps Commander, General Birdwood, called a meeting at Brown's Dip of all senior staff officers and officers of units down to regimental and battalion commanders, and explained the general scheme of operations. The primary operations consisted of a landing at Suvla Bay and an attack on the Turkish lines opposite the left flank on the Anzac position.

At the same time, a separate offensive was to be instituted along the whole of the Anzac position. German officers trench and Lone Pine positions were to be attacked and held, and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade (Ryrie) was ordered to attack and destroy the enemy works on Green Knoll (Bird Trenches) and Balkan Gun Pits on Harris Ridge. The 5th Light Horse Regiment was entrusted with this duty, the remainder of the Brigade supplying covering fire on Pine Ridge and Turkish Despair Works. The operations were to start at 5.30 p.m. on the evening of the 6th August by the attack on Lone Pine. All ranks were supplied with white armlets and white badges to be sewn on the tunics between the shoulders. This was necessary to enable our people to distinguish one another in the dark All bayonets were covered with sacking to prevent them glistening. The attack of the 5th Regiment was to commence at 8.30 p.m. It was not intended that the position seized by us should be retained, our operations being more in the nature of a raid.

All preparations were accordingly made, and at 8 p.m. the attacking troops filed out through our wire in front of our

trenches. A few minutes before the order was given to attack, orders came from Brigade that the operations so far as our Regiment were concerned were cancelled. The troops withdrew to their lines.

Towards the end of August the Brigadier (Ryrie) asked the Regiment to undertake offensive operations against the enemy on our front, and accordingly a scheme was put to the Brigade for the Regiment to attack the Balkan Gun Pit Trenches and Bird Trenches, being practically the operations which we had prepared for on the night of the 6th August. The scheme was approved, and was carried out in the early morning of the 23rd August, 1915.

Those who were present at the Peninsula will remember that Harris Ridge, on which Chatham's Post was situated, ran towards Twin Trenches parallel to the seashore, and about 400 yards therefrom. The sea side of this ridge was covered with very thick, low scrub. The Bird Trenches were situated about three or four hundred yards along Harris Ridge from Chatham's Post. At 3.55 a.m. "A" Squadron (Major Midgley, D.S.O.) filed out through the wire at Chatham's Post and "B" Squadron (Major Wright) through the Beach Post. "B" Squadron moved along the beach about 400 yards to a position opposite Bird Trenches. "C" Squadron remained in Chatham's Post in support. One machine gun was removed temporarily to Ryrie's Post, and one remained on the rear line.

Arrangements had been made for co-operation with the torpedo-boat destroyer on picket duty. At 3.55 a.m. the destroyer was signalled that "A" Squadron was moving out. The destroyer immediately opened fire upon the Bird Trenches and continued firing rapidly for three minutes, then switched on to the Balkan Gun Pits, 500 yards down the ridge. In the meantime, "A" Squadron was advancing, all fire reserved. When within 100 yards of the Bird Trenches "A" Squadron was fired upon. They still reserved their fire. When still closer bombs were thrown at them, which passed over their

heads without doing any damage. 'A' Squadron then rushed the trenches, first throwing their bombs into them. Some of the Turks were killed, the others retired to the trenches on the east slope of the Ridge. These trenches were then bombed and fired into by our men with their rifles. The Turks kept low down in their trenches and fired in the air.

While this was going on, "B" Squadron, from the beach, opened fire on the Balkan Gun Pits and the trenches in that neighbourhood. Heavy reinforcements were now coming forward to the Balkan Gun Pits. "A" Squadron then retired to Chatham's Post by the seaward side of the ridge. As soon as "A" Squadron retired from the neighbourhood of the Bird Trenches, "B" Squadron fired on that place, and "C" Squadron opened along the Ridge as soon as "A" Squadron had retired from it, and covered the retirement of "A" and "B" Squadrons. As soon as "A" Squadron left the enemy trenches the machine guns opened along the ridge, and kept up a covering fire until both "A" and "B" Squadrons had returned to our line.

The operations were carried out in an extremely satisfactory manner. our casualties being three wounded only.

Prior to the operations, arrangements had been made by which the Squadrons could show their movements by the firing of green flares. These arrangements worked as anticipated, and enabled the covering fire to he put on to the ground which had been vacated by the attacking squadron as soon as it had vacated it.

The bombs used on this and other operations until shortly before the evacuation, when a few Mills bombs were issued, were of the "jam tin" type. These "jam tin" bombs consisted of a tin about the size of a 1 lb. jam tin, filled with shrapnel bullets with a central explosive charge. The firing apparatus consisted of a short length of fuse sufficient to burn about four or five seconds. The serious disadvantage about this type of bomb in comparison with the later semi-automatic Mills bomb, was that they had to be lighted with a special match or fuse. One result of this was that a lot of bombs were thrown before they had really been lighted, and so became duds. The lighting was also a serious objection when being used in the open or trench rails, as a man had to stop

to light the match, and the lighted match gave away his position in the dark. Another objection was that the burning fuse emitted a trail of sparks, and it could be seen exactly from where it had come. In addition to this issue of these "jam tin" bombs, some members of the Regiment, particularly Major Midgley, became proficient in improvising similar bombs. Any old tin did for a container, while the explosive was got from the dud broom-stick bombs that were fired into our lines by the enemy, and the projectile in the bomb consisted of any bits of metal available. The fuse was obtained from the Engineers, and a very effective bomb was the result.

We also had a small issue of cricket ball bombs, which consisted of a round iron ball with an explosive charge inside. These were also lighted with an outside fuse, and in that respect were objectionable.

The Regiment was now called upon to supply reliefs for part of the Lone Pine position, which had been captured by our infantry on the evening of the 6th August. The whole of the Lone Pine positions had not been captured, and the situation was that our people held the western part of the position and the Turks held the eastern, there still being communication trenches between the two parts. The holding of Lone Pine had been a more expensive operation than the taking of it. On the 25th August we sent our first party of 130 men for duty for 48 hours. When we got there we found the position very unsatisfactory. The trenches themselves were most disagreeable; there were hundreds of dead bodies in the side saps and in the position, all, of course, in an advanced state of decomposition. A large number of these bodies were only partially buried. The sides of the trenches were oozing, and the whole of the trenches were covered with maggots which crawled over the men as they lay down to rest. The enemy were occupying their trenches within 20 to 30 yards from ours. If any movement were made, or a person spoke in ordinary tone, it immediately attracted bombs. It is satisfactory to state that this condition

of affairs was soon changed. We at once brought a number of periscope rifles into use, and obtained a large supply of bombs, and started an offensive against the Turks, and in a very short time obtained superiority and kept down their periscopes and suppressed their observation.

Part of the work of the troops on duty in these trenches was to smother the live bombs thrown in by the Turks before they could explode, often a matter of a fraction of a second. The men detailed for this job were given blankets. which they folded into eight or more thicknesses. As soon as a bomb dropped in the trench, it was the duty of the blanket man to jump at it and cover it with the blanket. Owing to the looseness of the blanket, and yet to the thickness of the folds, the flying pieces of bomb were smothered and did no harm. This was the sort of work which once earned Victoria Crosses, but with us was treated as an ordinary part of the day's work, and obtained no special recognition.

On the 29th August "B" Squadron, of the 11th Light Horse Regiment, under Major C. Lee, reported to this Regiment for duty, and was taken on as "D" Squadron. The reason for this was that the 4th Light Horse Brigade, when it came to Gallipoli, was not retained as a Brigade, nor were the Regiments kept together. The various Squadrons were sent round to the other Light Horse Regiments as reinforcements. While these reinforcements were moving into their new lines, the unusual movement attracted the attention of the Turkish gunners, with the result that some twenty shells were dropped in our area. One of these wounded our gallant Medical Officer, Captain Espie Dods, while he was in the open attending to a wounded man. The M.O. was evacuated, but returned in time for the operations in November (Wilson's Lookout). During his absence his work was carried on first by Captain Pilcer, then by Captain MacDonnell and then Captain Cooke (themselves evacuated), and finally by Major Croll.

32 History of the 5th Light Horse Regiment.

While this Regiment occupied the extreme right flank and on Harris Ridge, special attention was given to the matter of sniping and breaking in of the enemy's loop-holes. Special men were set off as snipers, and taken off other duties to enable them to give exclusive attention to their special job. As a sample of the work done, that of No. 355, W. E. Sing, can be referred to. Up to the end of September, this man was responsible for 150 casualties to the Turks by sniping. A special firing position was erected for him overlooking the Turkish lines at ranges from 150 to 400 yards. The modus operandi was as follows: Sing noticed a movement such as a glimpse of a face at a loop-hole. An observer then directed his telescope on the place indicated. Sing covered it with his rifle, and the moment the object again appeared the observer gave the word to fire. This Sing did, usually with success. The number of cases above reported was authentic. Sing often fired on other occasions, but where the result was doubtful or unobserved, no claim was made for a casualty. Sing's success was due, to a large extent, to his good eyesight and to his patience. He would remain for long periods with his eye along the sights of his rifle, whereas other men would not have the patience to do so. Sing's operations were far in excess of those of any other member of the Regiment, but many other men had casualties to their credit. General Birdwood, the Corps Commander, on the occasion of one of his numerous visits, commented on the effective sniping of this Regiment, as being far in excess of that of any other unit of the Anzac Corps. Sing was awarded the D.C.M. for his excellent work in this respect.

To prevent enemy sniping, special attention was given to the Turkish loop-holes. These loop-holes on our front were made of green bricks, that is, bricks unburned, but dried in the sun, about 12 in. x 8 in. x 4 in. As soon as these loop-holes were made or repaired within a distance of 400 yards, snipers were put on to them. The heads of the bullets were filed or rubbed off. Such a bullet hitting a brick would smash it to pieces. Five or six shots usually broke up the

four bricks forming the loop-hole. which then collapsed and became useless. This procedure was carried on to such an extent that sometimes there was not a serviceable enemy loop hole facing Chatham's Post within 400 yards of that place. Special attention was also given to the Turkish periscopes. The moment they appeared they were fired on, and smashed. This smashing of loop-holes and breaking of periscopes resulted in our people being almost free from enemy snipers. It might be mentioned that this sniping could not have been carried out without the aid of the telescopes which we had constantly in use. These were the telescopes that were originally issued to the regimental signallers. Without these telescopes the enemy movement would not in most cases be seen.

The following is a divisional memo. of 11th August 1915:

"From captured diaries and other sources of information it is apparent that the enemy has been suffering steady losses from the fire of our snipers. Commanding and other officers will explain to the men the value of thus establishing a fire superiority and encourage continual effort."

In September the Turks were first observed using periscope rifles. We had had them for some time, and found them very effective. During that month we also had our first experience of the so-called "broomstick" bombs. The first few did very little harm, but, towards the end, they became very deadly. They consisted usually of quick-firing gun brass cartridge cases. These cases were filled with dynamite, gelignite or other high explosive, together with iron slugs and pieces of metal of all descriptions. As many as 45 plugs of dynamite have been counted in one dud bomb. At the top of the case there was a percussion cap apparatus, and into the base of the cartridge case a wooden stick, 1¹/₂ inches through and about four feet long, was screwed. On the other end of this stick there was a leather washer to fit the barrel of the mortar from which it was fired. These things towards the time of the evacuation had a range of seven or eight hundred yards. The whole of our lines were in easy range of them. Our dug-outs consisted of niches cut in the reverse slopes of the hills. They had no head cover, as there

was no wood or galvanized iron available for that purpose. Several feet of earth roofing would have been required to keep these bombs out. Head cover, which was proof against bullets, was no protection against them. Light head cover was smashed in without the least trouble. The only protection against them would have been proper shell-proof dug-outs. It was not possible to make such dug-outs in our lines. Some were attempted, but, owing to the absence of timber for holding up the walls and roofs, they collapsed. The men would not willingly go into them. In any case, the front line trenches had to be open to enable the defenders to resist attacks. These "broomstick" bombs during the next couple of months claimed many casualties from our Regiment, and were undoubtedly the worst things we had to face. Shells you could usually avoid by keeping well under cover, but these things came straight down from the sky, and we had no protection of any sort. As many as 200 a day dropped on the lines held by our Regiment prior to the Evacuation.

In addition to these cartridge case bombs, they sometimes screwed obsolete howitzer shells on to the end of the rods, and also iron cylinders like stove piping, 15 inches long and weighing about 20 lb., these last containing a treacle-like fluid. What they were we do not know. They did no harm; probably something that failed to explode.

On the 29th September our first trench mortar was erected at Chatham's. Its first visible effect was to keep down somewhat the enemy sniping. Apparently the Turks were afraid to fire as much as formerly, as by so doing they would attract a bomb from this mortar. About this time there was issued to us for use a contrivance named "Charley's Wallaby Rest," Major Charley, of the 6th Regiment, being the inventor. The apparatus consisted of a steel shield with loop-hole through which a rifle protruded. The butt of the rifle worked over a lateral graduated scale, and also a horizontal one. The idea was in the day time to register an enemy loop-hole and take notice of the lateral and horizontal graduations, then at night one could, with the aid of the register, fire at the same loop-hole, and possibly catch enemy snipers or observers. The principle was good, but there were serious defects in the apparatus itself. Instead of the fixed part of the rifle being

near the muzzle, it was near the trigger; the result was that a slit about 6 inches x 3 inches had to be left to give the muzzle room to move to the right or left. The enemy's bullets soon found their way through this large hole. Moreover, the steel shield was made of soft metal, and the enemy's bullets perforated it like cheese. It was almost committing suicide to operate one of these machines, so not much benefit was derived from them.

On 2nd October 142 reinforcements, under Lieutenants Atkinson and Brown, reported.

During October we obtained a fishing net from Alexandria, with a view of catching some of the numerous fish that frequented the Aegean Sea. Major Croll, our Medical Officer, and Captain Wright took special interest in this matter. A raft (AE 606) was manufactured from some barrels and timber that had been washed up on the beach, from which to drop the net, but owing to the absence of proper oars it was rather cumbersome. Fishing had to be done at night, as daylight operations attracted bullets and shells. Unfortunately, this particular net would not hold the fish that were caught in it; the twine was perished. We sent for another and stronger net, but it had not arrived at the time of the Evacuation. We also arranged for a supply of eggs for the Regiment. Several large consignments came to hand, and were distributed at cost price among the members, but the entry of Bulgaria - from whence they came - into the War put an end to this welcome change of diet.

In October we were offered a couple of weeks change to the Islands. A vote of the Regiment turned the offer down. At the time the question of broomstick bombs had not become acute. A change meant that on our return we would probably have to dig a fresh set of dug-outs and collect a fresh lot of camp equipment. The opinion was almost unanimous that the short change was not worth subsequent inconvenience.

On 9th October, 1915, a successful minor operation took place. On that day a deserter from the Turkish lines was seen creeping along the beach from Gaba Tepe towards our lines. The enemy opened a brisk fire on him, and he finally, in a wounded condition, took cover under a bank on the beach about 600 yards south of our forward line. The enemy kept up a desultory fire on him all the rest of the afternoon. It was decided to bring this deserter in. Arrangements were made with the artillery at our call to put up a barrage, if required, beyond the deserter and on the scrubby part between Harris Ridge and the sea. Our machine gun also registered on this position. Lieutenant Brundrit (who had lately given up the position of Quartermaster and taken over a troop) and a party of 25 men moved out along the beach at dusk: This party moved under cover of the cliff for the first part of the journey, and when the cliff ended had to crawl for about 150 yards to keep from view of Harris Ridge, and the scrub thereon, which came to within 100 yards of the beach. A squadron of the Regiment was also sent out along the beach under cover of the cliffs as a support to Lieutenant Brundrit's party. The remainder of the Regiment occupied the trenches and prepared to give covering fire, if required, as the whole of the country in question was within easy rifle range. Stretcher bearers were taken with Lieutenant Brundrit's party. A "point" of four men, under Sergeant McDonald, reached the wounded man and proceeded twenty yards past him as cover to the patrol. It was now dark. Sergeant McDonald's party then saw advancing towards them, ten yards away, four Turks. followed by a supporting party of 15 or 20, apparently on a similar errand to our own. Our advance party immediately lay down and opened fire on them. Two of the Turks fell. The Turkish supporting party returned the fire. Lieutenant Brundrit brought up more men to the support of his advance party, the deserter was put on a stretcher and the Turks retired, some to the scrub and others along the beach. All our men then returned to our lines with the deserter and without any casualty. As stated above, arrangements had been made for a strong covering fire in case Lieutenant Brundrit

and his party were attacked in force from the scrub. They ran great risk, however, as practically the whole of their advance was a flank march within 100 yards of the scrub, on the west slope of Harris Ridge, which could easily have been occupied in force by the enemy. As anticipated, it was a question of who could get there first after the light began to fail. Although Lieutenant Brundrit had over 600 yards to go to the enemy's 100, he, by commendable despatch, got there first by a few seconds and carried out his object. Both General Birdwood, the Corps Commander, and General Walker, the Divisional Commander, sent their congratulations to Lieutenant Brundrit on his exploit.

During the month of October catapults were introduced. These catapults consisted of a triangular frame with a sling which was made of india rubber bands. The sling fired a cricket ball bomb and had a range up to 120 yards. They were extremely effective, and the men became very efficient in their use. One great advantage of them was that they were practically silent in the throwing and therefore did not attract so many bombs in return.

Towards the end of October it was observed that the Turks were building new works below the Bird Trenches, that is, between Chatham's Post and Bird Trenches, to the left of the Saddle. It was accordingly decided to push forward the forward tunnel in front of Chatham's and open a new firing line which would cover the dead ground. A tunnel to the right of the existing tunnel and on the right of Harris Ridge, to act as an alternative means of communication to this new firing line, was also started.

Further activity on the part of the Turks between Chatham's Post and Bird Trenches was now reported. It was suspected that they were intending to advance their line to high ground about 120 yards in front of Chatham's Post. It was imperative that they should not be allowed to do this, as, if they did, from this new position they could enfilade the rear of Ryrie's Post and Tasmania Post. Such a state of affairs would be most serious.

Accordingly on the afternoon of the 3rd November, 1915, instructions were received from Brigade to form a post 50 yards in advance of our forward tunnel, that is, 120 yards in front of Chatham's, with the object of preventing the enemy from occupying the ground which would enable them to bring direct rifle fire on the troops in rear of Ryrie's Post and Tasmania Post. A covering party, under Lieutenant Brundrit. was accordingly sent out after dark (night of 3rd-4th), followed by a working party, under command of Major Midgley. D.S.O. Possession was taken of the first old Turkish trench abutting on the right arm of the "T" of the forward tunnel and of the second old Turkish trench, which terminated 50 yards in front of the last mentioned trench. Substantial sandbag barricades were erected at the south end of the last mentioned trench, and to the left side, to block fire from Bird Trenches and Holly Spur. A couple of thousand sandbags had been filled during the afternoon, and these were passed along a chain of men to the required position. The two old Turkish trenches were deepened, barbed wire was laid in front of the new trench, the first old Turkish trench was connected with the second and a communication trench was cut back from the second old Turkish trench on the west slope of Harris Ridge to the mouth of the small branch tunnel which, eighteen yards from Chatham's Post, branches from the main tunnel to the right. The enemy did not interfere with our work on that night.

As a matter of fact, the enemy working parties could be heard a few yards away. Both sides had a definite job to complete, i.e., be dug in before daylight, and were quite happy to be left alone while they were doing it. It afterwards turned out that the enemy were digging a sap to the very ground that we had seized, and another 24 hours would have found them entrenched thereon. By dawn we had the ground sufficiently prepared to withstand rifle and gun fire during the day, and by the following evening we were ready to withstand any assault.

On the night of the 4th-5th the enemy made four attacks on the new post with bombs, machine guns and rifles, all of which attacks were repulsed. The expenditure of bombs by our people was very heavy - 800. Some of the enemy reached the reverse side of our parapet, where they were killed with

bombs, and pieces of Turks were to be picked up in our trenches. Sergeant Orr here did a brave act. One of our men threw a lighted bomb, but it struck the parapet and fell back into a tray of unlighted bombs. Sergeant Orr picked up the tray and threw the lot over the rear parapet. During this night the Turks erected two substantial barricades in front of our position, one at a distance of 22 yards, and the other at a distance of about 70 yards. These were connected by a communication trench with the lower part of Bird Trenches. On the night of 5th-6th we opened up five rifle pits off the left arm of the "T" of the main tunnel. These pits faced the east end of the Bird Trenches. Wire was laid in front of these pits. On the 7th instructions were received to advance the Post to the third old Turkish trench, a distance of 30 yards, which would enable us to enfilade the first Turkish barricade. A covering party, under Captain Brundrit, and working parties were accordingly moved out shortly after 8 p.m. on the 7th-8th. This third old trench was occupied and the enemy bombed out of their first barricade, which was levelled to the ground with slabs of guncotton-Lotbiniere bombs. Traverses and parapets were erected on the new ground. A communication trench back to the second old trench was opened up and wire was laid in front of the new position. This work was done under heavy bomb, rifle and machine gun fire from Turkish Despair Works, Bird Trenches and the second Turkish barricade. While commanding the covering party, Captain Brundrit was killed. This gallant officer, a splendid example to his men of contempt of danger, was emptying his revolver at a range of some fifteen yards into a group of Turkish riflemen, when he was shot through the head. The officers of the Regiment arranged for the erection of a memorial tablet to Captain Brundrit in the Grammar School, Brisbane.

On the 8th November the enemy subjected the new position to heavy artillery fire from a battery which they had planted near Twin Trenches, less than 2,000 yards, and demolished part of the forward parapet. The trenches were, however, being continually deepened, and so obviated the necessity of the original high parapets.

On the afternoon of the 8th November, the garrisoning of the advanced post for 24 hours was taken over by 100 men

of the 6th Light Horse (Cox) and a similar number of the 7th Light Horse (Onslow) took over the position on the afternoon of the 9th for a similar period.

Since the 4th November, working parties of the 4th, 6th and 7th Light Horse Regiments were supplied for consolidating the work. On the night of the 5th-6th and for some days afterwards a reserve of 200 infantry from the 3rd Infantry Brigade were available by night in case of a serious attack being made. Their services were not, however, called upon for this purpose, but their presence was of great value in giving confidence to the garrison and working parties. The assistance of the artillery throughout these operations was invaluable, and same was promptly rendered on request. The presence of the destroyer on our right flank was also of great service.

The new ground seized through the above operations was officially designated "Wilson's Lookout," in honour of the C.O. of the Regiment.

The following Order was issued by the Corps Commander on the 8th November:

"The Army Corps Commander wishes to express his appreciation of the action of the 2nd Light Horse Brigade in successfully advancing their position to Wilson's Lookout, on Harris Ridge, between the 3rd to 8th November, 1915. The operation was skilfully planned and carried out with vigour and determination. General Godley congratulates the 5th Light Horse, to whom the operation was entrusted, and to whose resource and gallantry the excellent result achieved is largely due. The enemy casualties in this engagement had been stated by prisoners to have reached a total of 500 killed and wounded. The following officers and N.C.O.'s have been particularly brought to the Army Corps Commander's notice:

Major Foster, W. J., Brigade Staff.

Captain Straker, E. O., Brigade Staff.

Captain Stanley, R. A., 2nd Signal Troop.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, L. C., 5th Light Horse Regiment.

Major Midgley, S., D.S.O., 5th Light Horse Regiment.

Lieutenant Brundrit, T. J., 5th Light Horse Regiment (killed in action).

Lieutenant Gee, H. J., 11th Light Horse Regiment.

No. 164, Sergeant Orr, J. E., 5th Light Horse Regiment.

No. 212, Sergeant Ryan, P. F., 6th Light Horse Regiment.

From the time the Regiment occupied "Wilson's Lookout," conditions of life there were very strenuous. "Broomstick" bombs rained upon us day and night. The guns which the enemy brought up and placed in the scrub near the Twin Trenches were less than 2,000 yards from our lines. They enfiladed the main trench of the Post. This trench was well traversed, but one was only safe from these guns if close under a traverse. Machine guns and artillery from Gaba Tepe fired into the new post on its right rear. The Bird Trenches overlooked us from the front, the Turkish Despair Works were some 150 yards on our left, the enemy artillery opposite Lone Pine shelled us from our left rear; in fact, our "front" faced an arc of more than 180 degrees. Casualties through battle and sickness had been very heavy, and the men were getting three out of four nights on duty. The working parties were heavy. For some time our only covered means of communication between Chatham's and the new post was a long, narrow tunnel, in which two men could pass with difficulty. A heavy shell exploding above this tunnel might wreck it at any moment. An alternate communication was necessary, which meant a lot of work. The whole of the new works had to be deepened and improved. Every night the results of the enemy artillery fire during the day had to be rectified. The effective strength of the Regiment was 320, all ranks.

The C.O. accordingly requested the Brigade to furnish parties from the 6th and 7th Regiments to assist in holding the Lookout. The C.O. of the 6th Regiment (Cox) demurred to this, and informed the Brigadier (Ryrie) that we should easily hold the position with the men at our disposal, to which the Brigadier replied: "Alright, you have more men than they have, if you think they have enough, you can easily hold their line with your regiment. The 5th Regiment will take over Ryrie's Post, and the 6th Chatham's and 'Wilsons.' "

The exchange was accordingly effected on the 26th November.

During the three weeks that the 5th had held Wilson's Lookout, we had 17 killed and 64 wounded. and 89 evacuated through sickness. The strain had been heavy. During the first five nights of Wilson's Lookout, there had practically been no sleep for anyone and after that the men had night duty three nights out of four. Add to this the strain caused by the "broomsticks," and the result was physical collapse of many and consequent evacuation.

During the last ten days we had the loan from the other three regiments of the Brigade, three out of every four nights, of three officers and sixty other ranks to help garrison the Lookout. It was the objection of the 6th Regiment to supply their quota that brought about our relief.

On the 26th November, we shifted into our new line - Ryrie's Post. The 6th Regiment were not, however, pleased with their transfer. Three days afterwards they applied for and obtained the help of 100 Infantry per day to help them in holding the post, and also applied to the Brigade for assistance from the other regiments thereof. This regiment with the others supplied a quota.

It had now started to rain. On the 27th it snowed. and up to the end of the month the ground was still frozen. The cold caused the troops much suffering. Some two months previous to this we had been informed that wood and iron would be made available for huts and the dugouts. It never arrived, however. Consequently, at the time when the snow fell, no cover was available for the troops, except that of each man's oil-sheet. When a man went on night shift he had to take his oil-sheet with him, so that his dugout in his absence got drenched with rain, even if it had been dry before.

The cold north wind and rain followed by the snow caused cases of frost-bitten feet. and one case of collapse. There were no means of artificial warmth available other than

the very limited amount of firewood issued. Numerous cases of rheumatism were reported. Until the weather thawed again the water ration was cut down to one-fourth - two pints per man per day - owing to the freezing of the water pipes. This short issue of water meant that the vegetables, rice and dried fruit issued could not be used and the troops had to live on bully beef and biscuit. No fresh bread during this period was issued, as there was no water with which to make it. At the time that this shortage of cover was felt there was much discontent, as it was then thought that we would he there for the whole of the winter. We afterwards understood why this timber had not been sent, as the question of evacuation had been decided. This, no doubt, accounted also for the fact that our reinforcements were not coming forward and that the regiments were down to about half strength. This reduction in numbers, of course, meant that the men who were there had to do double work, and this reacted on the sick rate, which naturally increased when men were on night duty night after night without relief.

Shortly after the snow storm in the end of November, there was an issue of rubber trench-boots (twelve per squadron) and an issue of 25 macintosh capes per squadron. just about enough to cause everybody to think that a full issue should have been made. Those issued were hardly enough for the actual sentries in the trenches, and it meant that every time a sentry was changed. he had to take his top boots and cape off. the result being that he often got a chill.

On the 14th December 1915, we first received advice that it was intended to evacuate the Anzac position, and we received instructions to get all our heavy baggage away. On the 17th December, definite instructions were received for the evacuation at a time and place to be communicated later. The next day we were informed that the times fixed were the nights of December 18th-19th and 19th-20th. The personnel of the Regiment were told off in the various parties as follows:

To Leave Night 18th-19th December, 1915.

No. Rank Name

Capt. Mullins, T.
Lieut. Christie, R.
118 S.Q.M.S. Luxford, S.
447 Armr./Sergt. Armour, W.
231 Sergt. Towner, A. G,
201 A/Sergt. Hammond, H. A.
897 Pte. Davison, E. C.
468 Pte. Waldon, W.
657 Pte Ogden, H. E.
614 Pte. Fogarty, A. G.
9 Pte. Lyons, J. M.
Capt. McLaughlin, H. F.
23 S.S.M. Warnes, H. W. S.
563 S.Q.M.S. Marshall. H. G.
478 Sergt. Smith, A. V.
247 Cpl. Dale, J.
71 Pte. Davis, W. E.
944 Pte. Hansen, V.
272 Pte. Hennegan, S.
708 Pte. Baldwin, R. J.
462 Pte. Byrne, G. W.
Lieut. Richard, R. R.
127 Sergt. Munro, V. A. C.
712 Pte. Daly, G. D.
863 Pte. Drury, A. M.
13 Pte. McCormack, C.
1009 Pte. Burrell, T. F.
511 Pte. Cooper, W. J.
739 Pte. Rose, A. E.
1090 Pte. Hallet, W. B.
1082 Pte. Treloar, A. V.
1087 Pte. Gardner, J.
951 Pte. Kebblewhite, E. A.
975 Pte. Westhoven, E. C.
1089 Pte. Lenihan, M.
271 Pte. Hosie, H.
375 Pte. Day, S.
549 Pte. Currie, T.

No. Rank Name
378 Pte. Guard, S. C.
161 Pte. Miller, E. R.
970 Pte. Shaw, H. H.
645 Pte. Morrison, F. A.
895 Pte. Stanley. G. W.
Cpl. Anderson, J. F.
Cpl. Hanly, P.
1037 Pte. Parker. H.
Pte. Weddell, W.
Pte. Giles, M. W.
19 Sergt. Stewart, R. J.
344 S.Q.M.S. Failhall, J. H.
648 Cpl. Williams, P. C.
225 Pte. Beazley. R. A.
39 Pte. Dawson. W. V.
125 Pte. Mitchell, A. A.
273 Pte. Richards. J. (A.V.C.).
1004 Pte. Austin, J.
1184 Pte. Markwell, J. T.
1152 Pte. Bonner, T.
Pte. Herbert, J. C.
1059 Pte. Handley. R.
Pte. Casey, E.
1034 Pte. McMahon, T. J.
Pte. Connell, J. T.
Pte. Walker, D. B.
1061 Pte. Hensley, S.
667 Pte. Ainsworth, F.
170 Sergt. Tooth, E. W.
772 S. Q.M.S. Hockings, E. R.
528 Cpl. Coffill, F.
11L.H./ 317 Pte. McMahon. S. M.
11L.H./ 387 Pte. O'Connor, W.
11L.H./ 257 Pte. Curel, J.
11L.H./ 303 Pte. Langston. F.
11L.H./ 345 Pte. Roach. T. T.
1067 Pte. Gilbey, W. H.

No. Rank Name
554 Pte. Sweet. J. T.
961 Pte. Oldham, W.
735 Pte. Norrie, A.
501 Pte. Dwyer, W. E.
206 Pte. Greene, W.
783 Pte. McGee, M.
1122 Pte. Waller, W. E.
1123 Pte. Croft, S. F.
427 Pte. Irvine, W. R.
1098 Pte. Allen, G.
1175 Pte. Hession, H.
1003 Pte. Armstrong, G. W.
1125 Pte. Childlow, R. J.
709 Pte. Crutchfield, G. A.
1110 Pte. Rowley. A. W.
1107 Pte. Clarke. R.
1117 Pte. Wallace, G. H.
641 Pte. Higgins, J.
771 Pte. Hinton. F. W.
258 Pte. Jennie, S. C.
11L.H./ 20 Pte. Cory. C. R.
11L.H./ 842 Pte. McLean. A.
11L.H./ 242 Pte. Reynolds. W.
11L.H./ 255 Pte. Cooper. E.W.S.
11L.H./ 401 Pte. Simpson. W.C.
11L.H. Lieut. Koch, W. J. F.
11L.H./ 227 Sergt. Farlow, F.G.

To Leave Night 19th-20th December, 1915.

A. 1 PARTY.
No. Rank Name

Capt. Dods, J. E.
Lieut. Orr, J. E.
293 Sergt. Ogg, E. C.
288 Sergt. Edginton, J. P.
530 Cpl. Chaille, W. M.
542 Pte. Russell, A.
1104 Pte. Neilson, C.
815 Pte. Bauer, A.
1103 Pte. Gilles. W. J.
1202 Pte. Underhill, J. F.
696 Pte. Bansgrove, W.
267 Pte. Knight, P.
250 Sergt. Radcliffe, B. H.
328 Cpl. Webster. T.
557 Pte. Mouritz. E. R.
958 Pte. McLellan, A.
883 Pte. Norman. T.
1113 Pte. Lambert, N.
535 Pte. Allen, A G.
441 Pte. Fuge, A. S.
532 Pte. Player. A. E.
1186 Pte. O'Dwyer. S.
1594a Cpl. Norcott, A. J.
719 Pte. Evans, E. O.
2168a Pte. Hollow, E. C.

A. 2 PARTY.
No. Rank Name

Lieut. Brown, H. S.
684 Sergt. Jones, J. G.
509 Sergt. Poynting, A. H.
321 Cpl. McMullen. R. V.
610 Cpl. Mullins, D.
932 Cpl. Boyd. 1.
866 Cpl. Elliott, L. E.
508 Cpl. Kirkland. H. K.
274 Pte. McAllister, C.
873 Pte. Joyce, F. J.
881 Pte. Moore, J. C.

1014 Pte. Drochman, F.
610 Pte. Moss, F. A.
315 Pte. McMullen, A. J.
820 Pte. Jones, S. R.
890 Pte. Rooks, J. H.
421 Pte. Lockhart, W. E.
982 Pte. Gauld, R. L.
346 Cpl. McKinnon. L.
5561 Pte. Cummings. R. L.
Pte. Shoobridhe, F. S. R. (A.A.M.C. Attached).
Sergt. Foot, G.
Pte. O'Hara, D.
149 Pte. Christensen, T.
487 Pte. Sidney, R. V.

B. 1 PARTY.

B.2 PARTY.

Lieut. Mahoney, B.
6008 Pte. Williams, A. E.
5442 Pte. Nobes, M. C. (A.A.M.C. Attached).
75 Sergt. Gahan, J.
740 Cpl. Robertson,
477 Cpl. Anderson. R.
294 Pte. Carroll, W.
938 Pte. Card, H.
42 Cpl. Johnstone, W. G.
58 Pte. Kessler, C. J.
465 Pte. Johns, H. A.
11L.H./264 Pte. Dreyer. W. C.

B.3 PARTY.

Left 20th December, 1915.

C.1 PARTY.

C.2 PARTY.

C.3 PARTY.

For some weeks prior to the Evacuation, and as we now know, in anticipation thereof, "silent ruses" were instituted. The first one, of three days and nights' duration, took place in the first week in December.

In ordinary course, there was a large amount of movement behind our lines, and this movement could be observed by the Turkish observation posts on Gaba Tepe. During the night, along the whole front line, desultory firing usually took place. Every sentry during each shift fired off a number of rounds at the enemy loopholes, and every now and again a machine gun would open fire towards the enemy trenches. Occasionally the artillery would fire a few rounds at night also. To carry out the "Silent Ruse," orders were issued that for the next three days movement in the Year of our line was to be reduced to a minimum. and that there was to be no firing from our lines by day or night, unless we were attacked. The result was that during these ruses there was an uncanny silence on our side. During the first two nights of the first silent ruse, the Turks did nothing, but on the third night they could stand it no longer, so they sent over a strong reconnaissance to investigate the cause of the silence. This reconnaissance came to within ten yards of the lines when the 7th Light Horse, who were on the alert, opened on them, with the result that the enemy left behind 20 bodies, which would mean probably another 50 wounded.

Three nights before we came away, we had another silent ruse for half an hour. The Turks stood it for fifteen minutes, then every man in their lines opened rapid fire. They apparently thought we had men out in front to attack them and that our reason for ceasing fire was so as not to hit our own men. Later on, the same night, we had another silent ruse for half an hour, but by this time the Turks had been educated and they would not open up. From this, it will be seen that we were getting them ready for the condition of things at and immediately after evacuation of our trenches Prior to Saturday, the 18th December, almost all the army stores, guns, mules, horses, etc.. had been sent away by sea. Some of the troops, including the 4th Light Horse Regiment. which was attached to the 2nd Brigade, and some battalions complete, were sent away, while the numbers of the remainder were reduced.

The strength of this regiment on Friday, the 17th. was 263. Twenty-five men were sent away that day, leaving 238 on Saturday morning. On Saturday morning 100 were sent away, leaving 138. These 138 were divided into three parties. A. B and C. of 75, 35 and 28 men each. Each of. these A. B and C parties were again divided into three sections, 1. 2 and 3.

On Sunday, the Brigade, originally of the strength of about 2,000 (4th, 5th. 6th and 7th Regiments) was now represented by about 450 men. As our Brigade held the extreme right of the line, we had about a mile to go to the place where embarkation was to take place.

On Sunday, the 19th, the Regimental A party, total 75, was to leave at 5.30 p.m., in three sections at intervals of fifteen minutes between sections, B party, total 35, was to start at 9.30 p.m., in three sections, and at similar intervals. and C party, total 28, was to start at 2.30 a.m. on the morning of the 20th in three sections, at intervals of fifteen minutes between sections. It will thus be seen that, from 10 p.m. to 2.30 a.m., an interval of 4.5 hours, four regiments, which consisted of about 2,000 men, would be represented by 112 men. It was arranged that the Brigadier, General Ryrie, should leave with the B party at 10 p.m., and from then on Lieut-Colonel L C. Wilson would have charge of the Brigade line with the C parties of the three regiments.

Major Midgley, D.S.O., was placed in charge of the Regimental C party of 28 all ranks; Lieutenant Stanfield, Major Wright and Lieutenant Waite in charge of C. 1, C.2 and C. 3 sections respectively, and Lieutenant Cain with the machine gun section with C party.

On 18th December an Army Corps Order, reading as follows, was issued:

'The Army Corps Commander wishes all ranks of the Division to be informed of the operations that are about to take place and a message conveyed to them from him to say that he deliberately takes them into his

confidence, trusting to their discretion and high soldierly qualities to carry out a task, the success of which will largely depend on their own individual efforts.

"if every man makes up his mind that he will leave the trenches quietly, when his turn comes, and see that everybody else does the same, and that up till that time he will carry on, as usual, there will be no difficulty of any kind, and the Army Corps Commander relies on the good sense and proved trustworthiness of every man of the Corps to ensure that this is done.

"In case by any chance we are attacked on either day, the Army Corps Commander is confident that the men who have to their credit such deeds as the original landing at Anzac, the repulse of the big Turkish attack on May ]8th, the capture of Lone Pine, the Apex and Hill 60 will hold their ground with the same valour and steadfastness as heretofore, however small in numbers that may be, and he wishes all men to understand that it is impossible for the Turks to know or tell what our numbers are, even up to the last portion of C party on the last night, as long as we stand our ground."

As the first parties went away, ammunition which would have been used by them was thrown into the sea, and supplies were gradually reduced in this manner until there were just sufficient for the parties remaining on the Peninsula.

It was important that the departure of the last of the parties should not become known or suspected by the enemy. To prevent such suspicion arising, the following ruse was availed of. Rifles were lashed and sighted through loop-holes pointing to the Turkish trenches. An empty tin can was attached to the trigger, of the rifle; above this trigger a tin filled with water was suspended, with a small plugged hole in the bottom. The last men to leave the trenches were to remove the plugs from the top tins and let the water trickle into the bottom tins. When a bottom tin was full, the weight would pull the trigger and the rifle would explode. The, result of this was that rifles would go off in our lines half an hour after the last man had left. The same result was obtained in another way by tying a weight on to the trigger of the rifle, then by another string taking the load off the first string. A bomb

lighter," otherwise a tightly rolled piece of bagging which burned at the rate of a foot an hour, was then so placed that when the bomb lighter had burned down a certain distance. it would burn the string which kept the load off the trigger. When this happened, the weight would drop with a jerk and fire the rifle.. Large numbers of rifles were fixed up in these ways with the result that rifles were exploding for a considerable time after the last man had got into the boats. Bombs were also thrown out in front with long fuses attached to them with the result that these bombs exploded after the last man had gone. During the last two days special movement went on behind our line I s, so that the enemy observation on Gaba Tepe would not become suspicious. Bogus fatigue parties carried empty water cans backwards and forwards so as to be taken for the usual water fatigues sort of theatrical armies, same men seen often.

Sunday night, 19th-20th, the night of the final evacuation, was calm with a bright moon. The boots of the men were covered with sacking to prevent the noise of marching being heard. Bayonets were covered in bagging to prevent them glistening in the moonlight.

Lieutenant Wetherell drew attention to the fact that it is not possible to see through a searchlight ray. It was the usual practice for a torpedo-boat destroyer to be stationed a few thousand yards off the right flank, from which she shelled the various Turkish positions during the night, and also kept her searchlight on the beach to see that there was no enemy movement thereon.

For some nights prior to the Evacuation, she was instructed to keep this light as a fixed ray for half an hour at a time at one spot. On the night of the Evacuation the destroyer put this ray on just prior to the time the parties were due to move. and kept it on until they had gained the boats. It was, therefore, not possible for the Turkish observation post at Gaba Tepe to notice any movement in rear of our lines.

As previously stated, most of the stores, etc., had been got away in good time. Some four worn-out guns were left. These fired up till late on Sunday evening, and were then destroyed. One 5 inch howitzer was left until the last, when, with the aid of one of the improvised bomb-lighter fuses, this gun was exploded after the parties had retired to the beach.

A premature explosion might have caused the Turks to suspect movement. It was the usual nightly practice of "Beachy Bill" to shell the beach. On the afternoon of the Sunday, it looked as if the Turks had gained some information of the intended departure, for on that afternoon they ranged on the exact spot on Brighton Beach that the pontoons on which we were to embark were to be erected after dark. This apparently was a coincidence, as while the Evacuation was on no unusual artillery firing took place.

Arrangements were made by the medical authorities that, if casualties occurred during the Evacuation, a medical party would remain behind to look after them. This party was to take its chance. There was no shortage of volunteers for the duty. Orders were issued that if men were wounded in the final parties and could not walk to the boats, they were to be left behind. Special instructions were also issued that once a party had left the trenches in accordance with the schedule, they were on no account to return to them to support the others still there in case of an attack.

The A and B parties moved off to time. Lieut.-Colonel Wilson then took over command of the C parties of the Brigade and handed over command of the Regimental C parties to Major Midgley, D.S.O. A and B parties had each one slight casualty from "overs" about a mile from the shore. They were the only casualties that the Regiment suffered during the Evacuation. Word came later that the C parties would commence to leave at 2 a.m. instead of 2.30 a.m., as the lighters of the B party had made a quicker trip than anticipated. C party moved in accordance with the amended timetable. C. I left the trenches, and Lieutenant Cain and his machine gun took up a position on a ridge a few hundred yards the trench side of the embarkation pontoons. C.2 moved out and to the boats at 2.15 a.m. Lieutenant Waite (C-3) counted his party-8 all told, and moved at 2.30 up to the rear line, pulling into the communication trench behind him the barbed wire prepared for that purpose. While waiting on the rear line for the C.3 party of the 6th Regiment from Wilson's Lookout to pass, Lieutenant Waite's attention was drawn to the fact that Trooper Murray, of the C-3 party, was not present. An examination of those present disclosed the fact that one of the eight was a C.2 man and that Murray was still

in the front line. The officer and a man at once went to the front line, which they reached with some difficulty owing to the wire in the communication trench, and found Murray still at his post, the end of the line. What had happened was that the O.C., C.2 party, had wrongly counted in Major Midgley, the commander of all the Regimental C parties, as one of his ten and left one of his own behind, and that when Lieutenant Waite collected seven men (one of whom in the dark was not noticed to be the C.2 man) he thought his party of eight was complete, and moved off accordingly. As it turned out, no evil resulted from the mistake and Murray joined his pasty, all of whom arrived in due course at the boats.

The Brigade C parties embarked on the boats at Brighton Beach as ordered. The last got aboard at 3.27 a.m. on the morning of 20th December, 1915. These parties transferred from the boats which were towed by a pinnace to a trawler, and proceeded to Mudros where they were transferred to the transport "Beltana" where the balance of the Regiment, less B parties, were awaiting. The same afternoon the transport sailed for Alexandria. B parties sailed to Alexandria per transport 'Anchises'. The 'Beltana' arrived at Alexandria on the 25th. The troops proceeded the same night to Cairo, detrained at Helmieh about 3 a.m. on the morning of the 26th December. On the morning of the 27th December, the Regiment proceeded to Maadi and occupied the old camp, where we found eight officers and 418 other ranks details and reinforcements awaiting us. The number of all ranks who left Anzac on the 18th, 19th and 20th December amounted to 263.

STATE AS AT EVACUATION.

Landed at Anzac, May, 1915 477
Reinforcements 552
1029
Effective Strength, 18th December 263
Embarked after notification of intended

Evacuation, to reduce numbers 16

Prisoner of War 1

Dead 75

Wounded, to Hospital (and still absent) 121
Sick, to Hospital (and still absent) 540
Transferred, etc. 13

Casualties. Anzac Campaign-
Dead (including 3 officers) 75
Wounded (including 16 officers) 266
341
Total evacuation for sickness
Officers 25
Other ranks 779
804
Grand total sick, wounded or killed (some of
whom sick or wounded more than once) 1145

Of these who landed with the Regiment in May, 1915, there were on the Peninsula at the Evacuation 105 all ranks.

Of these who were on the Peninsula without a break there were 49. Lieut.-Colonel L. C. Wilson and Captain Stanley of the Brigade Signalling Troop, were the only two original officers of the Brigade who survived the Campaign and never left the Peninsula between 20th May and 20th December, 1915.

When we arrived back at Cairo we found several officers and men who had been to England. It is here worthy of record that not a single officer or man who had been evacuated from the Peninsula to England returned to the Peninsula. From what could be learned from the men who went to England, every encouragement seemed to have been given to them to stop there, and no one ever appears to have been urged to go back to the Peninsula. The comfort of those who left the Peninsula was more considered than the interests of those at the Front who had to do extra work owing to the reduced strength of their units.

The following special Order was issued by Lieut.-General Sir Alexander Godley, K.C.M.G., C.B. Commanding Australian and New Zealand Army Corps:

"The Army Corps Commander has received for transmission to all ranks of the Army Corps congratulations from Sir Charles Munro, the Commander-in-Chief. and Sir William Birdwood, Commanding the Dardanelles Army, on the successful conduct of the difficult and delicate operation of withdrawing from the Gallipoli Peninsula. In forwarding these messages to the troops, Sir Alexander Godley wishes to express to all

officers; N.C.O.O's and men his thanks for the loyal cooperation and his admiration of the steadiness and coolness with which they carried out the orders. Had it not been that everyone played his part thoroughly and efficiently this most difficult task could not have been carried to such a successful conclusion.

"Australians and New Zealanders have added yet another gallant feat of arms to the already notable record of achievements of which their Dominions are so justly proud."

Very few decorations of any description were given for services on the Peninsula. This Regiment cannot complain, however, with regard to the share which it got of these that were issued, as the C.O., Lieut.-Colonel L. C. Wilson, and Major Midgley, D.S.O., each got a C.M.G.; Captain Dods, the medical officer of the Regiment, a M.C.; and Trooper Sing, a D.C.M. The last-mentioned members of the Regiment, together with Captain Brundrit and Captain Mullins, were also mentioned in Despatches.

Before completing the narrative of our experiences at Gallipoli, a few words on our domestic economy would not be out of place.

First, as to our housing accommodation, if such a term can be used where there was no house. We had no tents or huts. Tents would have been too noticeable from the Turkish lines and from their aeroplanes and would have attracted shell-fire. We had no huts, as there was no wood or galvanised iron available for that purpose. What little wood and iron there was, was used for erecting head cover over the machine gun positions. We had no large dug-outs of the sort used in France and Belgium--subterranean rooms safe from shell-fire. The soil was of a friable nature and the large excavations would have required timbering to make them safe, and there was no timber available for that purpose. A couple of experiments were made in that respect, one at Ryrie's Post and a similar one at Chatham's, but the excavations were so

dangerous looking that men would not willingly go into them. Largo lumps of earth were continually falling from the roof and the whole dug-out was liable to collapse at any moment. particularly if a shell exploded on the surface above. Our dugouts, accordingly, consisted of narrow slits on the edges of gulleys or off the sides of saps. In the former case. their height deepened on the steepness of the slope, and in the latter case, on the depth of the sap off which they were dug. This usually meant a depth of about six feet. In width. these dug-outs were about 2ft. 6 in., the width being governed by the breadth of the oil-sheet which commonly formed the, roof. Each of these dug-outs usually provided a habitation for two men.

There was no local fuel. What we had, was brought from overseas and was barely sufficient for cooking. There was none available for warming dug-outs in the cold nights of November and December. Shortly prior to the Evacuation. there was a rumour that stoves were to be supplied, one to each forty men. They, however, did not come to hand. Even if they had, they would not have been of much use owing to the fact that there were seldom more than two persons living in the dug-out. They would, of course, have been of use if forty men had lived in the same dug-out, but for reasons stated this was not practicable.

The matter of water supply has been dealt with in Chapter 10 of this narrative.

As to rations, see Appendix D. There were no local supplies. All came overseas. The scale set out in the Appendix was the scale in the latter days of our stay on Gallipoli. For some time after arriving on the Peninsula, the principal ration was bully beef (Fray Bentos) and army biscuit with a moderate issue of apricot jam (Sir Joseph Paxton). The men did their own cooking, or small parties of three or four arranged for it amongst themselves. Cooking did not amount to much while there was a bully beef issue. Variety was very limited. Bully beef could be eaten cold, or used in the form of stews, curries or rissoles. The biscuits were sometimes ground up into powder and made into porridge.

We had no canteen-wet or dry-on the Peninsula. Rumours from time to time spread that one was intended to be installed, but it did not materialise. On one or two occasions.

a small consignment of canteen stores came to Anzac but when distributed amongst the whole army, the amount was not of any practical value. On another occasion, each unit sent a small party across to Mudros for canteen stores, but, again, supplies were very limited in extent. During October, we obtained from Imbros eggs packed in cases of approximately sixty dozen each. These eggs were sold at cost price to the members of the Regiment at 2/6 per dozen. Our Regimental Fund purchased the first case and subsequently some fifteen more cases were received, costing between 120 and 130. No loss was incurred or profit made on these transactions. On Bulgaria coming into the War, this most acceptable variation came to an end, as the eggs came from Bulgaria. There was always a small amount of extra rations obtainable on the Beach from the crews of the trawlers. These people made a lucrative business of supplying, at exorbitant rates, groceries to the fatigue parties visiting the Beach. This source of supply was limited and was of no practical value to the men as a whole. Later on in the War. a few persons derived extra rations through the Parcel Mail, but in Gallipoli days this means of supply was very little used.

A few weeks after we occupied the line from the Beach several large casks of wine were washed ashore. They had probably broken away from some wreck. A little of this wine got into consumption in the Unit, but not much. As soon as it was known it was on the Beach, the Brigade authorities despatched a party to smash in the casks, fearing, no doubt, that misuse might be made of the wine.

There were no organised amusements on the Peninsula. Life was too strenuous and the general conditions forbade it. Even if the men had the energy, they could not be spared to train. Sports meant being in open spaces, and open spaces were particularly unhealthy. Occasionally, small parties were sent out to inspect other lines to see how the others lived. but casual wandering about was discouraged. The water and ration parties to the Beach continually suffered casualties from shell-fire, chiefly from 'Beachy Bill' and men noon learnt that the safest place to be was in their own trench system.

There was no leave to Egypt or England. On one occasion, as previously mentioned, an offer was made to the Regiment for a short period of leave to Mudros. but for the reasons previously mentioned, it did not eventuate.

There was no organised training in the way it was carried out in the latter parts of the War. Conditions were against it. From time to time. however, new weapons and apparatus were evolved, and the learning to handle this material evoked interest and gave variation to the monotony of trench warfare. Amongst such novel apparatus, there were periscopic rifles, jam-tin bombs, cricket ball bombs, Lotbiniere bombs. catapults, trench mortars, wallaby rests, Verey lights, rockets. and bomb lighters.

Mail at Gallipoli was rather erratic, as was also the matter of cables. One was supposed to be able to send cables by post to Egypt and have them despatched from there, but experience showed that in some cases a cable took six weeks to arrive in Australia.

The normal medical organisation is set out in Appendix F hereto. The sick rate is evidenced by the evacuations. which were much heavier than for any other similar period of the War. This was, no doubt, owing to the special circumstances of this campaign. The strain. both mental and physical, was heavy. The Regiment was in the front trenches continually from 30th May to 20 December-nearly seven months-without a single day in rest. There were no conveniences for giving a soldier a rest or a chance of recuperating otherwise than by evacuating him, and, as previously stated. there was no leave from the Peninsula. Although the Turks did not deliberately shell the ambulance camps, a man could not recuperate there as day and night there was a continuous scream of shells and hiss of bullets passing over the ambulance tents. Such conditions did not tend to peace of mind of patients and the only thing to do was to get them off to the hospital ship and away to Egypt or England as soon as possible. Apart from the noise of guns and projectiles, the supply of suitable food for men in a bad state of health was indifferent. As usual, there was a difference of opinion on-the matter of evacuations. It was reported in the trenches that an appeal had come from headquarters of the Australian Division asking medical officers for the honour of Australia to go slow in the matter of evacuations, while on the other hand. most medical officers thought it their duty, notwithstanding such appeal. to evacuate the sick and wounded men as soon as possible so as to give them a chance of recovering.

Upon our return to Maadi, action was at once taken to reorganise the Regiment and to train it as a mounted unit. The Regiment remained at Maadi until 23rd February, 1916. During this period heavy reinforcements arrived, reinforcements which had been ordered to make up the wastage which had taken place and which was expected to take place at Gallipoli.

Upon our return from Gallipoli, we found awaiting us the first instalment of comforts forwarded us by the 5th Light Horse Comforts Fund. This fund had been instituted in Brisbane in September, 1915, to send comforts to the Regiment in the field, as the Red Cross Society restricted their operations to the sick and wounded. The members of the original committee were Mesdames Hubert Harris, L. C. Wilson, Espie Dods, Frank Little, Macansh, McNeil, T. C. Miller, Ridley, W. F. Taylor, and Misses Macansh and Harris. Ladies who subsequently joined the committee were: Mesdames Leeds, Lockhart Gibson, John Sinclair, Andrew Scott, H. Love, Billington, D. Nelson and Pike, and Miss I. Sword. In the end of 1916, the Regimental Comforts Fund co-operated with certain other similar funds in opening the Coo-ee Cafe at Brisbane. From the Coo-ee Cafe the Regimental Fund drew, in the two years of the former's existence, 2,271 as its share of the profits. During the three years' operations of the Regimental Comforts Fund that fund remitted, either in money or in the form of purchased goods, 3,000 to the Regiment. In addition to this, they collected gifts, such as socks, etc., and forwarded them to the Regiment. The remittances of monies and goods were highly appreciated by the troops. They often came to hand when it was not practicable to obtain variation. to army rations in any other manner. The army authorities would send them up to the front area when transport was not available for canteen stores. These comforts were valued at more than their intrinsic value -a sentimental value was placed upon them, as their arrival showed the recipients that their women-folk in Australia were working in their interest, and so tended to keep up the general morale.

On the 7th January, 1916, Lieutenants Goymer and Dawson and 100 other ranks, being part of the 12th Reinforcements, reported. On the 10th January, reinforcements, 49 other ranks, being our 8th Reinforcements, reported from Mudros where they had been since the middle of November last. On the 18th January, Lieutenant Hannay and 2nd Lieutenant Land and 28 other ranks reported from the Western Front. These officers and men had been part of a composite regiment which had been formed in Egypt for action on the Western borders of Egypt against the Senussi. The operations against these tribesmen had been successful, their power had been broken, and those members of the Western Forces who were Light Horsemen were returned to their units. On the 19th February, 1916, Lieutenant Barwise and 102 other ranks of the 13th Reinforcements, reported for duty. At this date the Daily State was at its maximum, namely, thirty officers and 1052 other ranks. On the 22nd February, Major C. Lee with four officers and 121 other ranks, who, up to this time, had formed D Squadron of the 5th Light Horse Regiment, reported back to their original regiment, the 11th Light Horse, as that regiment was being re-formed.

About this time the 4th and 5th Australian Infantry Divisions were being formed in Egypt from surplus reinforcements and members of the 1st and 2nd Divisions. Artillery and Engineers were required, and as Light Horse units had a large surplus of reinforcements, volunteers from such surplus were called for the Artillery and Engineers. Some 390 of our reinforcements transferred to the Artillery, as did also a large number to the Engineers. We still had a surplus, and a considerable part of such surplus was shortly afterwards transferred to the Imperial Camel Corps, two and a half of the four battalions of which consisted of Australians. These troops were later on in 1918 formed into the 14th and 15th Light Horse Regiments. The Regiment itself was, in the meantime, organised up to its official War Establishment. Mounted drill was carried out in the Desert round Maadi, and musketry practice on miniature ranges was extensively carried out also.

On the 23rd February, the Regiment moved from Maadi to Serapeum on the Suez Canal, entraining at Abu-El-Ela Sta

tion, strength 550 all ranks, according to War Establishments, less those at the School of Instruction at Zeitoun. On the 9th March, Lieutenants Martyr and Nicholson and 102 others ranks, being our 14th Reinforcements, reported to our Details Camp at Maadi.

Upon the organisation of the Infantry for service in Europe, the 1st (Cox), 2nd (Ryrie), 3rd (Antill) Light Horse Brigades and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade (Chaytor) were formed into the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, commonly known as the Anzac Mounted Division. To this Division was attached four batteries of Horse Artillery-Territorials viz., Inverness, Ayrshire, Somerset and Leicester. The whole Division was under the command of Major-General Chauvel.

On arriving at Serapeum, part of the Regiment was engaged in occupying the Suez Canal Defences. 'B' Squadron (dismounted) occupied the inner line at Serapeum on the East Bank Defences, while 'C' Squadron (mounted) occupied the post at Devorsoir on the Canal, some few miles to the South.

That part of the Regiment which was not engaged in the above duty was occupied in training, including out-post schemes and similar exercise. While at Serapeum, the Brigade was inspected by General Birdwood, accompanied by His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales.

While at Serapeum, numerous requests were made to this and other Light Horse regiments to supply officers for the new infantry battalions which were being formed to constitute the 4th and 5th Divisions. Several members of the Regiment transferred to the Infantry under this scheme, including Captain McLaughlin and Lieutenants Hannay, Christie and Orr, all getting increased rank. Several of our N.C.O.'s were granted commissions in the Infantry.

Upon our return to Egypt, our medical officer, Captain Dods, M.C., transferred to the 1st Australian Division, with increased rank as D.D.M.S. His place was taken by Major Maclean, who carried on until the end of 1916, when he returned to Australia on Transport Duty. Captain Fitzhardinge then took over the duties of M.O. and held that position until the end of the War.

On the 4th April, the Regiment moved from Serapeum to Moascar en route to Salhia, at which place it arrived the following day-5th April. Salhia was the place where Napoleon started from on his invasion of Syria. On the 14th April, our 15th Reinforcements, including 2nd Lieutenants Archer and 2nd Lieutenant Trout, arrived at our Training Squadron, which was now situated at Tel-el-Kebir. The Regiment remained at Salhia from the 5th to the 22nd April, the time b

eing occupied in training. On the 21st April, instructions were received that the Regiment should proceed to Katie, via Kantara and Dueidar.

At this time, the 5th Mounted Brigade (Yeomanry) consisting of the Warwicks, Worcesters and Gloucesters, were stationed in the Katia Oasis Area with posts at Romani, Katie, Oghratina and Hamisah. Reports had lately been received by the authorities that signs of movements on the part of the Turks had been noticed in the Abd and Bayoud Districts, and it was to act as supports and reinforcements to the 5th Mounted Brigade that the 5th Regiment was moving out to Katie.

The Regiment accordingly marched from Salhia on the 22nd April, 1916 and arrived at Kantara at 1 p.m. Our orders were to move next day to Dueidar, an oasis twelve miles out on the Darb Sultani, or the Royal Road to Syria. At 7 a.m. on the 23rd, instructions were received from the G.O,C. 52nd Division (General Lawrence) that Dueidar post was at that time being attacked by the enemy, and we were instructed to send out one squadron at once and to follow on with the balance of the Regiment. Section headquarters at Kantara did not seem to be very anxious about the matter and did not apparently treat the enemy's action as very serious. At 8 a.m. Squadron, under Major Cameron, moved out towards Dueidar and reported at Hill 40 to Lieut.-Colonel Leggett, commanding the 155th Infantry Brigade. Major Cameron was then instructed to proceed at once to Dueidar and pursue the enemy. 'C' Squadron arrived at Dueidar at 12.15 a.m., where it found the Turkish rear-guard still firing into that post.

of Brigadier-General Pollock McCall. Action was at once taken to improve the defences of the post A large number of casualties suffered by the garrison on the attack of the 23rd had been inflicted while the men had been moving from the redoubt to and from the oasis across the open sand. Accordingly, a communication trench was dug from the oasis to No. 1 redoubt. Other posts were established around the oasis.

On the 30th April, 1916, Lieutenants Rutherford and Plant with 45 reinforcements marched into camp. The Regiment now engaged in a series of patrols. On the left we got into touch with the patrols from Romani, and on the right kept in touch with those from Ballybunion, to the front we patrolled out at this time a distance of about eight miles.

The country to the front of Dueidar was a fair sample of the Sinai Desert. The country is by no means flat. It is undulating with numerous gullies and ridges. The whole country is practically soft sand. In parts it is covered with a low scrub of two or three feet in height at intervals of five or ten yards apart. In other parts where the sand is shifting there is no vegetation of any kind. It is impossible to ordinary wheel traffic. To the tyres of some of the light vehicles we attached broad iron tyres. These prevented the wheels from sinking in the sand. Later on, contrivances known as 'pedrails' were attached to the gun wheels. These were much more efficient than the sand tyres. They -consisted of pieces of wood about a foot long and six inches wide attached to a couple of chains. This chain of boards was fixed on to the wheel. The particular piece of board under the wheel prevented the wheel from sinking in the sand while the short length of board did not clog up with sand like the broad iron tyre did.

Scattered over the strip of land from the Coast inland to a distance of ten to fifteen miles are numerous oases. These oases consist of from a few to several hundred date palm trees each. Wherever they are, water an be found at depths of from three to ten feet. in a few of these oases were native wells, the sides being rivetted with the ribs of palm trees, They were not of much use for obtaining large quantities of water as they usually choked up with sand when pumped from. The water to be found in these oases varies in quality.

It is all slightly brackish, some of it is fairly good for drinking purposes, and in others it is too salt for that purpose. Shortly after we came into this area, systematic well-sinking was carried on in the outlying oases, with a view to future requirements. The C.O. of this Regiment, shortly after our arrival at Dueidar, introduced what are known as 'Spearpoint Pumps.' They are known in Egypt as Abyssinia Wells,' or 'Norton Tubes.' The C.O. had seen them working in the Ayr District in North Queensland. They consisted of a tube 2 inches in diameter with a solid point. Just above the point the sides of the tube were perforated and covered with strong perforated gauze. Wherever there was water within ten feet of the surface, these tubes could be hammered into the sand and when they reached the water-bearing strata, an ordinary military pump could be attached to the tube and the water could be pumped therefrom without limitation. These 'points' could be hammered into the sand in a quarter or half an hour, whereas, it would have taken half a day at least to dig a well to have reached the same water-bearing strata. Moreover, they never choked and the water was free from surface pollution. We had several of these tubes made in Cairo and each squadron subsequently carried a complete set on pack horses during our sojourn in the Sinai Desert. Their value was so apparent that other units subsequently adopted them and several hundred were made for the use of the troops in this area by our engineers.

During the campaign the medical authorities, whenever practicable, clorinated the water used for drinking purposes. This made the water rather unpalatable, but like all other unpleasant things one got used to it. There was an issue of tablets in small glass bottles which all ranks were supposed to carry for water purification. A tablet dissolved in a bottle of water was guaranteed to kill all germs therein. No doubt it did, as-one of these tablets left in contact with leather burnt a hole in it. It was soon discovered that in solution they were an excellent preparation for removing rust from bits and stirrup irons. These leather-burning and rust-removing qualities of the tablets were sufficient to make men look askance at them. Apart from this, they made the water offensive to the taste, and accordingly they were never used for the purpose for which they were issued.

5

The Sinai Desert is very sparingly populated. On most of the oases there were traces of habitation which consisted merely of wind brakes made from palm leaves. Those inhabitants we had come across were very miserable specimens of humanity. Later on, all Bedouins seen by us were sent to the rear as we had good reason to believe that they were acting as intelligence personnel for the Turks. Our first stay at Dueidar-April to August-was not uninteresting.' We were detached from our own Brigade and we had to look after ourselves. The military situation was such that it behoved us to keep on the alert. Dueidar had been attacked on the 23rd April without the slightest warning, and there was no reason why the same thing could not occur again. It was no use depending on aerial reconnaissance, for, although our 'planes made daily reconnaissances far to our front, they failed to discover prior to the 18th July the existence of a Turkish column of some 18,000 men who had been marching for some weeks across the Desert from Beersheba. The Turks had marched by night and camped by day in the oases. When our 'planes were overhead, all movement was suspended, with the result that the presence of the enemy was unsuspected. The German 'planes were equally at fault. They came over daily and reconnoitered at least as far as the Canal. These visits of enemy 'planes were a source of great inconvenience to us. A regiment of massed horses was a too inviting target. As soon, therefore, as an enemy 'plan